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Abstract 
Employees are often reluctant to ask for advice, despite its potential benefits. Giving 
employees unsolicited advice may be a way to realize the benefits of advice without relying 
on them to ask for it. However, for these benefits to surface, it is critical to understand how 
employees react to unsolicited and solicited advice. Here, we suggest that recipients are likely 
to attribute self-serving motives to those providing unsolicited advice and prosocial motives 
to those providing solicited advice. These motives shape the extent to which recipients use 
advice, learn from it, and perform better as a result of receiving it. In an organizational 
network study of unsolicited and solicited advice ties (Study 1), an experience-sampling 
study of daily episodes of receiving unsolicited and solicited advice across two workweeks 
(Study 2), and an experiment where we manipulated advice solicitation and whether the 
advisor was a friend or a coworker (Study 3), we found general support for our model. 
Moderation analyses revealed that recipient reactions were not affected by friendship with the 
advisor, the number of overlapping advice ties between the advisor and recipient, or the 
position of the advisor in the social network. By showing how perceptions of the advisor’s 
motive can explain variability in the impact of unsolicited and solicited advice on recipients, 
this research clarifies the recipient reactions that advisors must navigate if their advice is to 
have impact at work. 
 
Keywords: advice; unsolicited advice; social networks; proactive behavior 
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“Distrust unsolicited advice.” – Aesop 
 The ancient Greek storyteller Aesop warned of the risks of unsolicited advice in “The 
Fox Without a Tail,” a fable in which a fox was ashamed to have lost his tail to a hunter’s 
trap. The fox then advises other foxes to cut off their own tails to diminish his embarrassment 
over his loss. Aesop concludes with the moral of the tale in the epigraph above, implying that 
individuals who provide advice without being asked are likely to have self-serving motives. 
 Aesop’s warning is often missing in the organizational advice literature, where 
scholars commonly regard advice as a valuable but neglected informational resource 
(Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Ghosh & Rosenkopf, 2015; Nebus, 2006). Advice sharing has clear 
benefits at the individual (e.g., Fang et al., 2015), team (e.g., Balkundi & Harrison, 2006), 
and organizational (e.g., Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993) levels of analysis, but individuals are 
often reluctant to ask for it (e.g., Brooks et al., 2015; Van der Vegt et al., 2006). Accordingly, 
one way for employees to have information without needing to ask for it would be to boost 
the amount of unsolicited advice sharing that occurs in the workplace. If such a strategy is to 
be successful, it is critical to understand how recipients react to unsolicited and solicited 
advice. 
Gaining a deeper understanding of employee reactions to unsolicited and solicited 
advice is important for three key reasons. First, empirical research that fails to differentiate 
between unsolicited and solicited advice may arrive at inaccurate estimates of the extent to 
which employees use advice, learn from it, and perform better as a result of receiving it. 
Second, the prevailing theoretical view of recipient reactions to unsolicited advice is 
borrowed from reactions to unsolicited help (Nadler & Fisher, 1986; Nadler, 2015), which, as 
we articulate and show in this paper, is misaligned with the properties of advice and 
highlights a need for an explanation specifically attuned to how employees respond to advice. 
Finally, if the benefits of unsolicited advice are to be realized in the workplace, it is important 
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for practitioners to understand how recipients react to unsolicited advice so that these 
reactions can be anticipated (and navigated) when offering advice without first being asked 
for it. 
Drawing on attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967), we suggest that, in the 
workplace, attributions of an advisor’s motive play an important role in understanding how 
employees react to unsolicited and solicited advice. When employees receive solicited 
advice, the advisor’s reason for providing advice is clear -- the recipient asked for it. In 
contrast, when employees receive unsolicited advice, the advisor’s motivation is more 
ambiguous, prompting recipients to think about why the advisor offered advice. Across three 
empirical studies, we develop and test theory suggesting that unsolicited advice is likely to 
appear self-serving and therefore be seen as less useful for learning and improving work 
performance, whereas solicited advice is likely to appear prosocial and therefore enhance 
these work-related advice outcomes (see Figure 1 for our conceptual model). 
In Study 1, we investigate how unsolicited and solicited advice ties in the social 
networks of three organizations relate to perceptions of self-enhancing and prosocial motives, 
which in turn affect perceptions of advice usefulness (Hypotheses 1-5b). In Study 2, we adopt 
an experience-sampling approach to study how daily instances of receiving unsolicited or 
solicited advice influence a broader range of perceived advisor motives (ranging from self-
serving to prosocial), which in turn affect daily perceptions of advice usefulness, learning 
opportunities, and task performance. In Study 3, we conduct an experiment to examine causal 
support for these linkages and to further investigate the moderating role of advisor friendship 
in how recipients perceive the advisor’s motive for providing advice (Hypotheses 6a-6b). 
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
Unsolicited Advice in the Workplace 
 We define unsolicited advice in organizations as work-related information containing 
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guidance or recommendations about prudent future action that the recipient did not request. 
We focus only on advice, rather than help, prosocial behavior, or citizenship behavior.1 In 
contrast to help, advice does not involve surrendering significant control over the task to the 
advisor, and allows the recipient to retain “agency in the decision-making process” (Brooks et 
al., 2015, p. 1422). Theoretically, the small amount of research on unsolicited advice that 
exists (e.g., Goldsmith, 2000; Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997) draws upon the threat-to-self-esteem 
model of reactions to help (Nadler & Fisher, 1986; see Nadler, 2015, for a review). 
Specifically, research on proactive helping (i.e., unsolicited help) shows that providing 
unsolicited assistance to recipients implies that they are incapable of adequately completing 
the task on their own, which can strip them of their sense of autonomy and lower their self-
esteem (Deelstra et al., 2003; Thompson & Bolino, 2018) because the helper often completes 
a part of the work on the recipients’ behalf (Spitzmuller & van Dyne, 2013). Similarly, 
communications researchers have studied how unsolicited advice can be interpreted as 
“butting in” or implying criticism of the recipient (e.g., Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Paik, 2020; 
Van Swol et al., 2017; Van Swol et al., 2019), but has stopped short of systematically 
examining work-related advice outcomes. 
Although people experience negative emotional and physiological reactions when 
someone takes over part of a task without being asked (Deelstra et al., 2003), there are 
reasons to doubt the suitability of this explanation for unsolicited advice. Advice does not 
deprive recipients of autonomy and control in the way that help does (Brooks et al., 2015)—
by definition, recipients are the final decision-makers. In addition, when unsolicited helping 
 
1
 Advice is also related to but distinct from prosocial behavior (“acts that promote or protect the welfare of 
individuals”; Bolino & Grant, 2016, p. 602) because advice, for example, can also be seen as a strategic attempt 
to expose differences between the advisor and the recipient in terms of his or her knowledge, skill, or ability, 
similar to ‘overhelping’ (Gilbert & Silvera, 1996). It is distinguishable from prosocial behavior because advice 
can also be interpreted by the recipient as harmful or corrosive to one’s well-being, relationships, or 
performance, as in the case of social undermining advice (Duffy et al., 2012). Finally, advice is more specific 
than citizenship behavior, which tends to be broader, encompassing additional behaviors such as compliance, 
altruism, and sportsmanship (e.g., Organ, 2018; Venkataramani & Dalal, 2007). 
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occurs, helpers assume a degree of involvement in the task (see, for example, Fisher, 
Pillemer, & Amabile, 2018), whereas when unsolicited advice occurs, the advisor is 
providing guidance or recommendations as opposed to taking part in the work itself. Thus, 
the properties of advice are not isomorphic with help and, theoretically, it is crucial to 
account for specific advice properties to further our understanding how unsolicited and 
solicited advice affect employee reactions and work outcomes. 
Attribution Theory and Employees Reactions to Unsolicited and Solicited Advice 
 We adopt a perspective grounded in attribution theory, positing that employees seek 
causal explanations for others’ behavior, especially in response to proactive behaviors, such 
as unsolicited advice, that lack a clear, observable trigger (Grant et al., 2009; Parker et al., 
2019). According to attribution theory (Heider, 1958), people try to infer the mental states of 
others (e.g., motivations) as a way to understand the causes of their intentional behavior 
(Allen & Rush, 1998; Eastman, 1994; Malle, 2011). In the case of seemingly supportive 
behaviors like advice, the key question for recipients is whether advisors are prosocially 
motivated (e.g., it is truly intended for their benefit) or whether, like Aesop’s fox, advisors 
have a self-serving ulterior motive (Allen & Rush, 1998; Ames et al., 2004; Blau, 1964; 
Eastman, 1994; Johnson et al., 2002). On the surface, advisors are attempting to aid the 
recipient in deciding on a particular option or course of action. By framing their information 
as aid, the advisor maintains at least an appearance of prosocial motivation. 
But do recipients accept this altruistic explanation for advisors’ behavior, or do they 
seek another? We argue that this depends on whether advice was solicited. If advice is 
solicited, the cause of advice is clear -- recipients asked for it. Solicited advice conforms to 
social and conversational norms in that people make good-faith efforts to comply with or 
respond clearly to direct requests (Flynn & Lake, 2008). Thus, because solicited advice was 
triggered by their own request, recipients likely infer the advice was triggered by their need 
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and is for their benefit. This leads recipients to infer that the advisor has prosocial motives. 
 However, recipients may infer that unsolicited advice is driven by self-serving 
motives -- they give advice because they derive utility from doing so. Individuals who give 
unsolicited advice may be seeking to aggrandize themselves, to show off what they know, or 
to demonstrate expertise in a certain domain, thereby creating the impression they are 
interested in impressing the recipient. Unsolicited advice often makes an implicit claim about 
the expertise of both parties -- the advisor is claiming to know better than the recipient 
(Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). When the topic at hand is a critical work concern, unsolicited 
advice may also imply a temporary status hierarchy (Feng & Magen, 2016; van Swol, Prahl, 
MacGeorge, & Branch, 2019), in which the recipient is obligated to acknowledge the 
advisor’s expertise. Because social norms make it difficult for recipients to refuse what, on 
the surface, seems like a prosocial, generous act, unsolicited advice puts recipients in the 
position of politely granting advisors’ claims of expertise, even if they do not privately accept 
them. Thus, advisors may be motivated to give unsolicited advice because they gain “face” in 
the interaction (Goffman, 1967) and feel valued by recipients. However, recipients are likely 
to feel coerced into these acknowledgements, leading them to attribute self-serving 
motivations to providers of unsolicited advice. This logic implies that: 
Hypothesis 1: Unsolicited advice is positively related to the recipient attributing the 
advice to self-serving motives. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Solicited advice is positively related to the recipient attributing the 
advice to prosocial motives. 
 
How Attributions of Advisors’ Motives Affect Employees’ Reactions to Advice 
 
 The motives that people assign to others’ behavior can influence important outcomes, 
such as evaluations and reward decisions. Seemingly helpful behaviors are rewarded when 
people perceive them to be triggered by prosocial motives (Allen & Rush, 1998; Eastman, 
1994; Johnson et al., 2002; Schnake, 1991). For instance, research has shown that employee 
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citizenship behaviors are associated with higher performance evaluations, in part because of 
evaluators’ attributions of prosocial motives (Allen & Rush, 1998). Conversely, seemingly 
helpful behaviors are not rewarded or are even punished when perceived to be motived by 
self-serving motives. For example, managers are likely to assign lower performance ratings to 
subordinates when citizenship behavior appears to be motivated by impression management 
(a self-serving motive; Halbesleben et al., 2010). 
We argue that reactions to advice are also linked to motive attributions: How 
recipients attribute advice to self-serving or prosocial motives is likely to shape their 
evaluations of the advice’s usefulness, as well as the extent to which it helps them learn and 
perform their jobs better (which we investigate in Studies 2 and 3). Prosocial motives are 
likely to match individuals’ pre-existing ideas or schemas about what constitutes a “helpful 
person,” and elicit fewer doubts regarding the potential benefits of the advice (Allen & Rush, 
1998; Johnson et al., 2002). Thus, people are more likely to use advice perceived as 
prosocially motivated to inform their decisions and behavior, including learning from it or 
using it to improve task performance. In contrast, self-serving motives may raise suspicions 
about the value of the advice and lead recipients to discount it. Advice triggered by self-
serving motivations is likely to be seen as merely showing off or insincere (Bolino, 1999; 
Halbesleben et al., 2010), leading recipients to infer that givers may not have provided 
accurate information or opinions. Moreover, self-serving motives are often associated with 
“slimy” work behaviors (e.g., Vonk, 1998). Accordingly, recipients may question the benefit 
of advice that appears to be motivated by self-serving reasons, such as a desire to show off or 
impress the recipient, and thus discount it. 
Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of self-serving motives are negatively related to recipients’ 
perceptions of advice usefulness, learning, and performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Perceptions of prosocial motives are positively related to recipients’ 
perceptions of advice usefulness, learning, and performance. 
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Together, the logic above suggests a mediated model in which unsolicited advice is 
positively related to perceptions of self-serving motives, which in turn negatively affects 
advice outcomes, and solicited advice is positively related to perceptions of prosocial 
motives, which in turn positively affects advice outcomes. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5a: Perceptions of self-serving motives will mediate the relationship 
between unsolicited advice and perceived usefulness, learning, and performance. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Perceptions of prosocial motives will mediate the relationship between 
solicited advice and perceived usefulness, learning, and performance. 
 
Unsolicited Advice and Friendship 
 
Our attributional perspective suggests that when it is less clear why someone is 
offering advice (as it is in the case of unsolicited advice, relative to solicited advice), 
recipients are more likely to look for explanations regarding the advisor’s motive. Although 
unsolicited advice is usually seen as self-serving, when it comes from someone considered as 
a friend at work (as opposed to a coworker), it may be interpreted differently. Friendship 
between advisors and recipients thus stands out as an especially relevant variable that may 
reduce attributions of self-serving motives (and enhance attributions of prosocial motives) to 
unsolicited advice. 
Research has shown that people are especially likely to seek and take advice from 
friends (Ingram & Zou, 2008; McDonald & Westphal, 2003). Employees’ evaluations of 
others’ behavior are influenced by affective relationships (Sherf & Venkataramani, 2015). 
According to attribution theory, people make attributions about others’ behavior that are 
consistent with their prior expectations (Eastman 1994; Johnson et al., 2002). Friendship, by 
definition, is likely to be characterized by communal norms rather than social exchange 
norms (Clark & Mills, 1979; Goffman, 1967; Pillemer & Rothbard, 2018), including the 
expectation that friends will look after each other’s affective and relational needs (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995). Friends at work, relative to other coworkers, should therefore be perceived 
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as less likely to provide unsolicited advice that is motivated by self-serving reasons and be 
perceived as more likely to provide unsolicited advice that is motivated by prosocial reasons. 
Hypothesis 6a: Friendship will moderate the relationship between advice solicitation 
and perceptions of self-serving motives, such that recipients will be less likely to 
attribute self-serving motives to friends (relative to coworkers) who provide 
unsolicited advice. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Friendship will moderate the relationship between advice solicitation 
and perceptions of prosocial motives, such that recipients will be more likely to 





Participants. We collected data from full-time employees (N = 131, Mage = 33.53, SD 
= 8.18, 53.8% women) at three U.K. marketing agencies where advice was critical to the 
collaborative nature of employees’ everyday work (overall response rate = 92.9%).2 The final 
sample consisted of a total of 1,421 dyadic observations (our unit of analysis). 
Predictors: Unsolicited and solicited advice networks. We used the roster method 
for collecting advice network data (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). Each person saw a list of all employees in the organization and was asked who 
provided them with either unsolicited or solicited advice (or both) over the last six months: 
“When you ask for it, do they give you advice?” and “Even when you do not ask for it, do 
they give you advice?” We created binary variables for an advice tie to exist if person i 
reported that person j gave person i advice, even when person i did not ask for it (an 
unsolicited advice tie), and if person i reported that person j gave person i advice when 
person i asked for it (a solicited advice tie).3 
 
2
 We received approval for this research by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Protocol #5140/004: 
“Unsolicited Advice in the Workplace”). 
3 We focus on advice that is sufficiently significant to be recalled by the recipient. Research shows that people 
are generally accurate in recalling their typical interactions with others (Freeman, 1992; Freeman et al., 1987; 
Freeman & Webster, 1994). An alternative measure could be whether the advisor reports providing advice to the 
recipient, irrespective of whether the recipient remembers the advice being provided. Considering that our 
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Mediators: Perceptions of advisor motives. After the advice network questions, for 
each advisor listed, we asked participants to answer the following questions on a five-point 
scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always): “When this person provides me with advice, I feel he/she 
is doing so to try to impress me” (reflecting a self-serving motive), and “When this person 
provides me with advice, I feel he/she is doing so for my own personal benefit” (reflecting a 
prosocial motive). To ensure that our measures exhibited adequate convergent validity with 
longer measures (Edwards, 2003), we conducted out-of-sample validation tests (see the 
Appendix). 
Outcome variable: Perceived usefulness of the advice. For each person who 
provided solicited or unsolicited advice, we asked the participant to rate the extent to which 
they found this person’s advice useful on a five-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal). 
Control variables. First, because a recipient’s perception of advice may be 
influenced by whether the advisor also receives unsolicited or solicited advice, we included 
binary variables to control for whether the advisor also reported receiving unsolicited or 
solicited advice. Second, two-way exchanges of advice may reflect mutual bonds between 
people who are less concerned with each other’s motives for providing different forms of 
advice, so we also included dyad-level binary variables that indicate reciprocal unsolicited 
and solicited advice exchanges. Third, to control for alternative explanations concerning 
power, demographics, or relative expertise, we controlled for the age, tenure, hierarchical 
level, and gender of the recipient and the advisor, as well as whether the advisor was the 
recipient’s supervisor. Finally, because advice from similar coworkers may be more relevant 
or threatening (e.g., Nadler & Fisher, 1986, p. 97), we controlled for similarity between 
recipients and advisors on three dimensions: gender, age, and hierarchical level. 
 
theory is about recipient reactions to advice (and the use of such advice), if a recipient does not remember the 
advice being shared, then they are unlikely to have any significant reactions to it. 
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Analytic procedure. We estimated cross-classified random effects models to account 
for the non-independence in our data (i.e., clustering due to multiple observations for each 
recipient, advisor, and dyadic relationship). This type of multilevel model is appropriate for 
data that do not exhibit a clear hierarchical structure (i.e., observations are not clustered in a 
single higher-level unit). Intercept-only models showed that 42 percent, 7 percent, and 6 
percent of the variance could be attributed to differences between recipients, advisors, and 
dyads, respectively, indicating that cross-classified multilevel models are appropriate. 
Results and Discussion 
Employees reported receiving an average of 5.73 unsolicited advice ties and 14.68 
solicited advice ties. Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for study variables. 
----- Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 about here ----- 
Hypothesis tests. As shown in Table 3, employees who received unsolicited advice 
from work colleagues tended to rate them as being motivated by a desire to impress (a self-
serving motivation), γ = .14, 95% CI [.03, .24], p = .011), providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
We also found that employees who received solicited advice from work colleagues tended to 
rate them as being motivated by a desire to benefit the recipient (a prosocial motivation), γ = 
.22, 95% CI [.06, .38], p = .008, supporting Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative 
relationship between attributions of self-serving motivations and the perceived usefulness of 
the advice, which was supported, γ = -.17, 95% CI [-.23, -.11], p < .001. Similarly, 
Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between attributions of prosocial motivations 
and the perceived usefulness of the advice, γ = .47, 95% CI [.42, .53], p < .001, providing 
support for Hypothesis 4.  
Tests of exploratory moderators. As shown in Table A2 (Appendix), supplemental 
analyses exploring possible network moderators of these relationships were non-significant. 
Tests of indirect effects. Using a Monte Carlo procedure with 20,000 repetitions to 
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estimate a confidence interval around each indirect effect (Selig & Preacher, 2008), we found 
support for Hypotheses 5a and 5b. The link between unsolicited advice and perceived 
usefulness was mediated, in part, by perceptions of the advisor attempting to impress the 
recipient, indirect effect = -.023, 95% CI [-.05, -.004]. Similarly, the effect of solicited advice 
on perceived usefulness could be partly explained by perceptions of the advisor attempting to 
benefit the recipient, indirect effect = .102, 95% CI [.03, .18]. 
Discussion. These results suggest that employees perceive unsolicited advice as 
motivated by a desire to impress the recipient, which reduces how useful the recipient 
perceives the advice to be, whereas employees perceive solicited advice as motivated by a 
desire to benefit them, which enhances evaluations of usefulness. Study 1 thus provides 
initial support for the notion that attributions of advisor motives help explain how unsolicited 
and solicited advice affect one important advice outcome (perceived usefulness). 
However, Study 1 had several limitations. First, we asked employees to evaluate 
advice relations in their social networks over six months, which tapped into their chronic 
perceptions each advisor. In the workplace, however, advice is episodic, and advisors can 
provide advice for seemingly different reasons across multiple occasions. Second, whereas 
our initial test used two theoretically grounded perceptions of advisor motives, employees 
may think others provide advice for numerous reasons, not merely the two under 
investigation. We therefore developed a broader conceptualization of advisor motives based 
on exploratory qualitative research, which we test in the next study. Finally, to explore 
broader consequences resulting from unsolicited and solicited advice, we focus on two 
additional outcomes—daily perceptions of learning and performance. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. In collaboration with a research agency based in the Netherlands, we 
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recruited 107 individuals (Mage = 39.06, SD = 13.04, 43% women) from a panel of volunteers 
who were working full-time in jobs requiring regular interactions with coworkers. Ten 
participants completed surveys but reported receiving no advice during the study period, so 
they did not contribute any data to the study (final sample as above). 
Procedure and measures. Using an experience-sampling design, we sent daily 
surveys to participants near the end of their workday (approximately 4:00 pm) for 10 
consecutive business days, which could be completed until 10:00 pm the same day. We chose 
this timeframe because it offered a sufficient number of daily measurements to capture advice 
episodes without fatiguing respondents, consistent with prior research (e.g., Ilies et al., 2009; 
Judge & Ilies, 2004). We followed Brislin’s (1980) forward-and-back translation procedure 
to convert English survey questions into Dutch. All participants completed at least eight daily 
surveys, with a total response rate of 92% (1,079 completed surveys/1,179 total possible). 
Predictors: Unsolicited and solicited advice. Each daily survey contained two initial 
questions, presented in randomized order, about the advice they received at work that day: 
“We would like you to think about the people at work who have given you advice today, even 
when you did not ask for it. In the spaces below, please write the names of the people who 
gave you advice when you did not ask for it (i.e., unsolicited advice). You may list up to three 
people.” The question for solicited advice was identical, except that we asked them to name 
the people who gave them advice when they did ask for it (i.e., solicited advice). We used a 
binary variable to reflect either unsolicited (1) or solicited (0) advice. 
Mediators: Perceptions of advisor motives. We conducted an exploratory pilot 
study to develop a broader set of perceived advisor motives (full details are provided in the 
Appendix). We asked 150 full-time employees to write about receiving unsolicited and 
solicited advice, including why they thought they received it. The first and second authors 
then induced seven distinct motives for giving advice (Williamson et al., 1982): (1) expose 
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differences, (2) flaunt knowledge, (3) hurt or hinder, (4) take control, (5) benefit from output, 
(6) fulfill obligations, and (7) benefit the recipient. To test the content validity of our motive 
categories, two experienced research assistants read the original advice descriptions and 
independently rated the extent to which each description matched each of the seven motives. 
Ratings showed high correspondence (i.e., the descriptions matched the definition of a 
particular motive) and distinctiveness (i.e., ratings were higher for a focal motive than 
others), supporting the content validity of these perceived motives (Colquitt et al., 2019). 
Using these seven motives, we asked participants to report the extent to which they 
felt the advice was triggered by each motive on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). The seven items are shown in Table 4.  
----- Insert Table 4 about here ----- 
Outcome variables: Daily perceptions of advice usefulness, learning, and task 
performance. We asked participants to rate, for each advisor, the extent to which they found 
this person’s advice useful on a five-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal). We 
measured learning by asking participants to rate each advisor in terms of how much they have 
learned from receiving advice from this person today (1 = nothing at all, 5 = a great deal). 
We measured daily task performance with the statement, “This person’s advice helped me 
perform the tasks expected of me today” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
Control variables. First, we controlled for differences in relative rank (Goldsmith & 
Fitch, 1997; Jungermann & Fischer, 2005) by asking whether the advisor was at a lower rank, 
the same rank, or a higher rank. Second, employees are more likely to seek advice when the 
topic or issue is complex (Schrah et al., 2006; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995), so we asked 
individuals to report, for each advisor, the complexity of the topic on which advice was given 
(1 = simple, 5 = complex). Third, advice history with the advisor may shape attributions, so 
we coded advice history as “1” if the recipient listed the same person as providing either form 
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of advice more than once during the study period and “0” otherwise. Fourth, we included 
variables for the gender of the advisor and the recipient (1 = female, 0 = male). Finally, we 
controlled for the possibility that advice sharing norms (e.g., Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004) 
could affect how people react to and evaluate advice using three items assessed at the study’s 
onset (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; α = .78). An example item was, “Giving and 
receiving advice is a normal thing for people to do in my organization.” 
Analytic procedure. We used cross-classified multilevel models with dyadic advice 
exchanges (observations) nested within recipients and advisors. Intercept-only models across 
our three outcomes showed that significant variance could be attributed to differences 
between recipients (15-37%) and advisors (14-24%), but not across days of the week (< 1%), 
so we retained random intercepts only for recipients and advisors. We person-mean-centered 
the perceived advisor motives and advice topic complexity (Level 1) variables at each 
recipient’s mean (Hofmann et al., 2000; Ohly et al., 2010).  
Results and Discussion 
Employees received, on average, unsolicited advice from 3.21 individuals and 
solicited advice from 6.83 individuals over the two-workweek study period. We present 
descriptive statistics for study variables in Table 5. 
----- Insert Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 about here ----- 
Hypothesis tests. Table 6 reveals that daily instances of receiving unsolicited advice, 
relative to solicited advice, were more likely to be attributed to the advisor’s desire to expose 
differences, γ = .15, 95% CI [.03, .28], p = .017; flaunt knowledge, γ = .24, 95% CI [.13, .34], 
p < .001; and hurt or hinder the recipient, γ = .20, 95% CI [.12, .29], p < .001; but not to take 
control, γ = .09, 95% CI [-.04, .21], p = .165. Unsolicited advice was also linked to 
perceptions of the advisor attempting to directly benefit from the recipient’s output, γ = -.12, 
95% CI [-.23, .00], p = .049, albeit in the opposite direction from other self-serving motives. 
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These results provide moderate support for Hypothesis 1. Solicited advice, in contrast to 
unsolicited advice, was more likely to be attributed to a desire to benefit the recipient, γ = -
.20, 95% CI [-.30, -.09], p < .001, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
The overall pattern of results, shown in Table 7, provides partial support for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. Self-serving motives for advice, such as flaunting knowledge or taking 
control, diminished the impact of advice, although one self-serving motive (benefiting from 
the output) was significant in the opposite direction (which we discuss below). Prosocial 
motives (a desire to benefit the recipient) enhanced the impact of advice. 
Tests of indirect effects. Two mediation pathways linking solicitation to all three 
outcomes were significant, providing partial support for Hypotheses 5a and 5b: Unsolicited 
advice, relative to solicited advice, was likely to be perceived as an attempt to flaunt 
knowledge, which reduced perceived usefulness, learning, and task performance. Solicited 
advice, relative to unsolicited advice, tended to be perceived as motivated by a desire to 
benefit the recipient, which enhanced perceived usefulness, learning, and task performance. 
Discussion. We replicated and extended the results of Study 1 in a daily experience-
sampling study that assessed receiving unsolicited and solicited advice across two 
workweeks. The self-serving attributions of a desire to flaunt knowledge and to hurt or hinder 
largely helped explain why unsolicited advice had less impact than solicited advice, whereas 
the prosocial attribution of a desire to benefit the recipient largely helped explain why 
solicited advice had more impact. Other motives—exposing differences, taking control, and 
benefiting from output—were non-significant or inconsistent mediators of the relationships 
between advice solicitation and work-related advice outcomes. 
To address concerns about the limitations of self-report data and common source bias 
in Studies 1 and 2, we conducted an experiment (Study 3). In this experiment, we also aimed 
to test a critical moderator variable—friendship (Hypotheses 6a-6b).  




 Participants. We recruited 629 employees (Mage = 36.68, SD = 10.21, 56.6% women, 
two missing responses) from Amazon Mechanical Turk.4 
 Procedure and measures. The experiment featured a 2 (advice: unsolicited or 
solicited) x 2 (friendship: close personal friend at work or coworker) between-person design. 
In all conditions, participants received the same hypothetical advice, but the advice was either 
unsolicited (coded = 1) or solicited (0) and delivered by either a close personal friend at work 
(coded = 1) or a coworker (0). Participants read the following: 
Please imagine you are working in a media agency and you just finished a meeting 
with a client. After returning to your office, a coworker [a person you consider to be a 
close personal friend at work] stops by. Without being asked, your coworker [friend] 
offers you the following unsolicited advice about next steps. 
 
In the solicited advice condition, participants read, “You ask your coworker [friend] 
for some advice, who offers you the following solicited advice about next steps.” Then all 
participants read the following: 
Hey, when putting together the report for the client, make sure that our 
recommendations are evidence-based. Show them the market research we've done in 
these areas. And keep the report streamlined and easy to follow. They won't read it if 
it's packed with too much text. 
 
Mediators: Perceptions of self-serving and prosocial motives. We captured self-
serving motives with the three items (α = .93), “He or she wants to benefit himself/herself 
rather than me,” “He or she has self-serving motives,” and “He or she is motivated by a 
desire to benefit himself/herself.” We measured prosocial motives with four items (α = .84) 
adapted from Grant’s (2008) prosocial motivation measure, including, “He or she is very 
conscious of the positive impact his or her advice has on others,” and “He or she is very 
 
4
 We followed best practice recommendations (Cheung et al., 2017) and excluded individuals who did not 
satisfy several data quality checks (full details of inclusion criteria are in the Appendix). 
RECEIVING UNSOLICITED ADVICE      18 
 
aware of the ways in which their advice is benefiting others.” Both measures used seven-
point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Outcome variables: Perceptions of advice usefulness, learning, and performance. 
We asked participants to use a five-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = a great deal) to estimate 
how much they would find the advice useful, handy, and practical (usefulness; α = .91); how 
much the advice would help them learn about their job, increase their knowledge at work, and 
become a smarter person (learning; α = .90); and how much the advice would enhance their 
performance, productivity, and efficiency (performance; α = .91). 
Manipulation checks. At the end of the survey, we asked participants to report 
whether they received unsolicited advice, solicited advice, or none of the above, and whether 
a coworker or a friend best describes the person who gave them advice, or none of the above.  
Results 
 Tests of manipulation checks. Participants were largely able to recall whether they 
received unsolicited (266/308; 86%) or solicited advice (236/311; 85%), χ2 (1, N = 619) = 
242.36, p < .001, as well as being able to recall whether they received advice from a friend 
(243/316; 77%) or a coworker (299/308, 97%), χ2 (1, N = 624) = 354.54, p < .001.5 
 Hypothesis tests. Replicating the results of the previous two studies, results from our 
first-stage moderated mediation analyses (Hayes, 2017) showed that unsolicited advice was 
perceived as more self-serving than solicited advice, solicited advice was perceived as more 
prosocial than unsolicited advice, and motives largely affect perceptions of advice outcomes, 
which in turn help explain the solicitation-outcomes link (see Table 9). However, does 
friendship moderate the relationship between advice solicitation and perceptions of self-
serving motives, such that unsolicited advice from friends is less likely to be attributed to 
self-serving motives (Hypothesis 6a) and more likely to be attributed to prosocial motives 
 
5
 Sample size differences are due to missing data. 
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than coworkers (Hypothesis 6b)? The answer is no: The interaction between advice 
solicitation and perceptions of self-serving motives was not significant, b = -.10, 95% CI [-
.36, .56], p = .673. Similarly, the interaction between advice solicitation and perceptions of 
prosocial motives was also not significant, b = .06, 95% CI [-.22, .35], p = .653. Consistent 
with these results, there was also no evidence involving friendship as a first-stage moderator 
of the advice solicitation->motives relationship in moderated mediation models testing the 
effects of advice solicitation on estimates of advice usefulness, learning, and performance via 
perceptions of self-serving or prosocial motives (Table 10). 
----- Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here ----- 
Discussion 
 Even when individuals are presented with identical advice, advice solicitation shapes 
perceptions of advisor motives, which in turn affects estimates of its usefulness and its 
potential to enhance learning and performance. However, friendship did not moderate these 
relationships as we had predicted. These results extend the findings from our previous two 
studies by providing experimental evidence for our model and addressing concerns about 
common source bias. 
General Discussion  
Unsolicited and solicited advice differ in their effects on recipients. In Study 1, social 
network analyses showed that employees across three organizations attributed unsolicited 
advice ties to self-serving motives, which reduced the perceived usefulness of advice, 
whereas employees attributed solicited advice to prosocial motives, which enhanced 
perceived usefulness. In Study 2, we largely replicated and extended these results in an 
experience-sampling study of advice, perceived motives, and daily perceptions of usefulness, 
learning, and performance. Our results clarify the specific motives that link advice 
solicitation to work-related advice outcomes—unsolicited advice was likely to be perceived 
RECEIVING UNSOLICITED ADVICE      20 
 
as self-serving (flaunting knowledge), which reduced perceived usefulness, learning, and 
performance, whereas solicited advice was likely to be perceived as prosocial (benefiting the 
recipient), which enhanced perceived usefulness, learning, and performance. In Study 3, we 
provided experimental support for our model and found that friendship did not interact with 
advice solicitation to influence perceptions of advisor motives. 
Our paper offers two important contributions to theory and research. First, advice 
solicitation is a critical determinant of work-related advice outcomes. A key implication of 
our findings is that neglecting whether advice is solicited may obscure meaningful 
differences in the impact of advice on recipients and advice flows at work. Although prior 
research has shown the benefits of advice sharing in organizations (e.g., Balkundi & 
Harrison, 2006; Fang et al., 2015; Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993), we show that advice 
solicitation shapes whether these benefits are realized. Our findings illustrate that, when 
employees provide unsolicited advice, recipients discount its value and may fail to fully 
absorb its information. For advice scholars, this suggests that conflating solicited and 
unsolicited advice may lead to erroneous conclusions about the effects of advice giving and 
receiving in organizations. Similarly, focusing only on solicited advice may mask the 
potentially harmful interpersonal consequences of unsolicited advice. Future research should 
thus specify whether advice is solicited in both theory and measurement. 
Second, our finding that perceived motives matter for our understanding of employee 
reactions to unsolicited and solicited advice provides a key answer to a longstanding call for 
theory addressing how people react to unsolicited advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006, p. 136). 
By drawing on attribution theory, we highlight a missing theoretical link—how employees 
react to advice is shaped by perceptions of the advisor’s motive. Our theory and research 
depart from prior research that has explained reactions to unsolicited help in terms of 
threatening the recipient’s autonomy (e.g., Deelstra et al., 2003). We find that the motive 
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most similar to threatening the recipient’s autonomy—taking control—predicted the effect of 
advice but did not explain differences between unsolicited and solicited advice. Thus, the 
notion that unsolicited advice is poorly received because it deprives recipients of autonomy 
(e.g., Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Paik, 2020; Van Swol et al., 2019) is, at best, incomplete. An 
important contribution of our work is thus in the attributional perspective attuned to the 
specific properties of advice. Theoretically, this paper helps shift the focus away from 
unsolicited advice threatening the recipient’s autonomy toward a perspective that is 
concerned with how the advice affects perceptions of what led the advisor to provide it. 
Surprisingly, we did not find that people made more generous attributions to friends, 
attenuating the negative effects of unsolicited advice (Hypotheses 6a-6b). Nor were those 
who were members of the same social groups (i.e., more third-party ties in common) viewed 
more favorably when they offered unsolicited advice (Study 1, Table A2). In fact, no variable 
we tested significantly reduced the negative attributions associated with unsolicited advice 
(Study 1, Table A2). These results highlight the surprising robustness of advice solicitation— 
employees appear suspicious of unsolicited advice even if, for example, the advisor shares 
advice with the same people as the recipient (Study 1), the advisor is central or a broker in the 
unsolicited advice network (Study 1), or the advisor is a friend (Study 3). Indeed, because 
people may need advice at work but be unaware of their need for it, future research should 
investigate under which conditions unsolicited advice might be positively viewed. 
These studies are not without limitations. First, although we provide experimental 
support for our model in Study 3, Studies 1 and 2 are correlational and rely on self-report data 
from a common source. Second, unsolicited advice was significantly but negatively related to 
attributions of the advisor benefiting directly from the recipient’s effort or outputs (Study 2), 
which ran counter to our initial predictions. This attribution benefits the advisor, so we 
classified it with other self-serving motives. Empirically, however, this motive has more in 
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common with prosocial motives of benefiting the recipient, as it was also positively related to 
solicited advice and advice impact. One potential explanation is that solicited advice may be 
more readily sought from advisors whose outcomes are interdependent with the recipients’.  
Organizational research has emphasized the benefits of advice sharing, which implies 
that unsolicited advice will be beneficial. Yet, it appears that Aesop was prescient in his 
remarks about how people react to unsolicited advice. Offering advice without being asked 
for it diminishes its value, even when it comes from close relations. Although our findings 
present a challenge to common views of advice as an informational resource, they echo the 
words of the fabled Greek storyteller—employees distrust unsolicited advice.  
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Note. Solid lines depict the relationships that we test in all studies. Short dashed lines depict 
extensions of our model to daily perceptions of learning and task performance that we 
examine in Studies 2 and 3. The longer dashed line depicts friendship as a moderator that we 
test in Study 3. Hypotheses 5a and 5b (mediation hypotheses linking advice solicitation to 
outcomes via perceptions of advisor motive) are not shown for stylistic purposes. In Study 1, 
employees could report receiving both unsolicited and solicited advice from a person over a 
six-month period (as above), whereas in the advice episodes examined in Studies 2 and 3, 
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 Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 1 
Variable M  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Advisor hierarchical level 2.38 1.17              
2. Advisor gender .54 0.50 -.09             
3. Advisor tenure 3.35 3.48 .47 -.26            
4. Advisor age 33.53 8.18 .58 -.06 .51           
5. Advisor is recipient’s supervisor .02 0.13 .28 -.01 .21 .20          
6. Recipient gender .54 0.50 -.07 .06 -.05 -.08 -.02         
7. Recipient hierarchical level 2.37 3.47 .05 -.04 .05 .01 -.05 .04        
8. Recipient tenure 3.35 3.48 .12 -.06 .09 .06 .01 -.30 .40       
9. Recipient age 33.53 8.18 .00 -.03 .03 .08 -.02 .04 .52 .36      
10. Solicited advice .30 0.46 -.07 .00 -.02 -.07 -.03 .07 .06 -.02 .03     
11. Unsolicited advice .12 0.32 .23 .04 .10 .21 .20 -.02 -.04 .02 .00 -.40    
12. Prosocial attributions 4.27 0.90 -.05 -.04 -.09 -.10 -.01 .22 -.15 -.11 -.02 .13 -.06   
13. Self-serving attributions 1.37 0.74 .00 .04 .00 .01 -.03 -.01 .16 .06 .12 -.13 .18 -.36  
14. Advice usefulness 3.92 1.02 .15 -.06 .07 .08 .12 -.02 -.17 -.02 .00 .09 .09 .46 -.33 
Note. N = 1,421. Correlations greater than |.04| in absolute magnitude are significant at p < .05 (two-tailed). Advisor gender is coded 1 = female, 
0 = male.





Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Dyadic Variables in Study 1 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Dyadic age similarity 25.11 7.14     
2. Dyadic level similarity 2.81 1.07 .36**    
3. Dyadic gender similarity .50 .50 -.05** -.05**   
4. Dyadic unsolicited advice 
reciprocity 
.07 .25 .05** .02** -.05**  
5. Dyadic solicited advice reciprocity .22 .42 -.00** -.03** -.04** .33** 
Note. N = 1,421. Dyadic variables are coded such that high scores refer to higher levels of 
similarity. * p < .05 (two-tailed) ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
  




Results of Cross-Classified Multilevel Models Predicting Advisor’s Perceived Motives and 












Predictor γ   s.e.    γ s.e. γ s.e. 
Intercept 4.58 * .33 .87 * .33 1.85** .37 
Control variables       
     Recipient hierarchical level -.09** .06 .05** .06 -.06** .06 
     Recipient gender .22** .11 .01** .11 -.03** .11 
     Recipient tenure .01** .02 .03** .02 -.00** .02 
     Recipient age -.00** .01 .01** .01 -.00** .01 
     Advisor is recipient’s  
     supervisor 
.07** .08 -.07** .08 .17** .08 
     Advisor gender -.11** .05 .02** .05 -.06** .06 
     Advisor tenure -.01** .01 -.00** .01 .00** .01 
     Advisor hierarchical level .03** .03 -.02** .03 .08** .03 
     Advisor age -.01** .00 .00** .00 .00** .00 
     Dyadic age similarity .00** .00 -.00** .00 -.00** .00 
     Dyadic level similarity .00** .02 .02** .02 .05** .02 
     Dyadic gender similarity -.05** .03 .00** .03 -.02** .03 
     Unsolicited advice  
     reciprocity 
.04** .06 .07** .06 .08** .06 
     Solicited advice reciprocity .03** .05 -.02** .05 -.01** .05 
     Giving solicited advice .01** .04 .09** .04 .13** .04 
     Giving unsolicited advice -.00** .05 -.02** .04 -.02** .05 
Predictors       
     Receiving unsolicited  
     advice 
.04** .06 .14** .05 .28** .06 
     Receiving solicited advice .22** .08 -.14** .08 .24** .08 
Mediators       
     Perceived self-serving      -.17** .03 
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     motives 
     Perceived prosocial  
     motives 
    .47** .03 
              -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
    3001.96      2876.35 2938.70 
Note. N = 1,421. Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors are reported. 
Dummy variables for company are included (not shown). Gender similarity is a binary 
variable reflecting whether both members of the dyad are the same gender. Following prior 
research on similarity (e.g., Klein, Lim, Saltz, & Mayer, 2004), we computed age and 
hierarchical level similarity as an absolute value of the distance between the recipient and 
giver’s scores on these values, multiplied by -1 so that higher scores indicate greater 
similarity. * p < .05 ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 4        
Perceived Motives for Study 2  




“they want to show they 
have a superior level of 
knowledge, skill, or 












to make the 
recipient feel 
inferior 
.93 .47 Self-serving 
Flaunt 
knowledge 
“they want to flaunt their 
own knowledge, skill, or 













at their job 
.96 .78 Self-serving 
Hurt or hinder  “they want to hurt or 
hinder my confidence, 
performance, or work 
relationships” 
Advisor wants 
the recipient to 
fail 
Advisor wants 






.94 .85 Self-serving 
and Anti-social 
Take control “they want to take control 





to take charge 
Advisor thinks 
like a manager 
.88 .78 Self-serving 
Benefit from 
output 
 “they benefit directly 
from my effort or outputs 
Advisor wants 




be harmed or 
inconvenience




the task being 
done well 
.59 .41 Self-serving 














has to provide 
it 
It is a part of 
the advisor’s 
job 








“they want me to benefit 
from the advice” 
Advisor wants 
the recipient to 
perform a task 
better 
Advisor wants 
to protect the 
recipient 
Advisor wants 
to make the 
task easier 
.92 .87 Prosocial 
Notes. htc = Hinkin Tracey correspondence statistic capturing the degree to which advice episode descriptions correspond to the given definition. 
htd = Hinkin Tracey distinctiveness statistic capturing the degree to which advice episode descriptions correspond more to the focal definition 
than to other definitions (see Colquitt et al., 2019, as well as Hinkin & Tracey, 1999, for further details on these content validity statistics). The 
stem for the items was: “This person gave me advice because…”. 
  




Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 2 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Age 39.06 13.04                  
2. Gender .43 .50 -.03                 
3. Advisor rank 2.11 .66 -.03 .13                
4. Advisor gender 1.34 .47 -.08 .30 -.09               
5. Advice history .93 .25 .04 .12 .13 -.08              
6. Topic 
complexity 
2.79 1.22 .00 .00 .19 -.12 .12             
7. Advice sharing 
norms 
4.02 .74 -.11 -.17 -.10 .05 -.16 .00            
8. Unsolicited 
advice 
.49 .50 -.05 -.10 -.4 -.05 -.13 -.15 .00           
9. Expose 
differences 
2.17 1.20 .00 .00 .05 -.06 .04 .05 .00 .07          
10. Flaunt 
knowledge 
1.88 1.09 .00 .00 -.03 -.05 .00 -.07 .00 .15 .54         
11. Hurt or hinder 1.57 .92 .00 .00 -.06 -.03 -.00 -.15 .00 .18 .36 .60        
12. Take control 2.56 1.24 .00 .00 .85 -.03 .09 .07 .00 .04 .25 .31 .25       
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Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
13. Benefit from 
output 
3.26 1.29 .00 .00 .19 -.04 .09 .21 .00 -.09 .03 -.04 -.10 .27      
14. Fulfill 
obligations 
3.00 1.21 .00 .00 .07 -.04 .03 .11 .00 -.10 .10 .03 .04 .12 .15     
15. Benefit the 
recipient 
4.07 .92 .00 .00 .04 .05 .02 .17 .00 -.14 -.17 -.33 -.41 -.12 .15 .01    
16. Usefulness 3.45 .91 -.14 .00 .93 .06 -.03 .30 .17 -.26 -.14 -.34 -.34 -.15 .16 .05 .33   
17. Learning 2.78 1.02 -.27 -.15 -.00 .00 -.07 .31 .20 -.13 -.06 -.18 -.22 -.06 .12 .08 .18 .62  
18. Task 
performance 
3.43 .96 -.14 -.04 .00 .04 .08 .22 .17 -.24 -.06 -.21 -.22 -.10 .18 .11 .25 .57 .50 
Note. N = 1,075. Correlations with absolute values greater than |.06| are significant at p < .05. Advisor gender is coded 1 = female, 0 = male. 
Descriptive statistics for the person-mean-centered variables (perceived motives and topic complexity) are shown. 
  




Results of Cross-Classified Multilevel Models Predicting the Perceptions of the Advisor’s Motive in Study 2 












Predictor    γ s.e.    γ s.e.    γ s.e.    γ s.e.    γ s.e.    γ s.e.    γ s.e. 
Intercept 2.97** .63* 2.98** .57* 2.60** .48*  3.39** .63* 2.10*** .70* 3.93** .67 2.86** .43* 
Age -.01* .01* -.01* .01* -.00* .00* -.00* .01* -.02*** .01 -.01* .01 -.01* .00 
Gender -.07* .16* -.03* .14* -.14* .12* -.06* .16* -.41* .18 -.48** .17 -.09* .11 
Advisor gender -.15* .08* -.12* .07* -.10* .06* -.01* .08*  .01* .08 -.09* .07 -.16* .06 
Advisor relative rank -.09* .06* -.04* .05* -.06* .04* -.19** .06* -.34** .05 -.06* .05 -.03* .05 
Topic complexity -.03* .03* -.02* .03* -.07** .02* -.04* .03* -.11** .03 -.06* .03 -.11** .03 
Advice sharing norms -.34** .11* -.31** .10* -.20* .09* -.38** .11* -.22* .13 -.07* .12 -.28** .08 
Advice history -.10* .07* -.06 .07* -.05* .05* -.27** .08* -.19** .07 -.02* .06 -.04* .06 
Unsolicited advice -.15* .06 -.24** .05 -.20** .04 -.09 .06 -.12* .06 -.15** .06 -.20** .05 
  -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
3008.97 2718.53 2205.88 3039.38 2886.07 2883.49 2586.93 
Note. N = 1,075. a This motive is not hypothesized as a mediator because it cannot be categorized as self-serving or prosocial. Unsolicited advice 
is coded 1 = unsolicited advice, 0 = solicited advice. Each motive was preceded by the stem, “This person gave me advice because…”. 
Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors are reported. * p < .05 ** p < .01 




Results of Cross-Classified Multilevel Models Predicting Advice Outcomes in Study 2 
 Advice Outcomes 
 Usefulness Learning Task performance 
Predictor γ s.e. γ s.e. γ s.e. 
Intercept 2.84** .40 2.70** .50 2.86** .44 
Control variables       
Recipient age -.01** .00 -.02** .00 -.01** .00 
Recipient gender .03** .09 -.15* .13 .01** .11 
Advisor relative rank .05** .04 -.00** .04 -.06** .05 
Advisor gender .03** .06 -.02** .06 -.01** .06 
Advice history -.04** .05 .01** .05 .12** .06 
Topic complexity .21** .02 .29** .02 .14** .03 
Advice sharing norms .20** .06 .23** .09 .25** .08 
Predictor       
     Unsolicited advice -.27** .05 -.19** .05 -.28** .05 
Mediators       
Expose differences .04** .03 .01** .03 .06** .03 
Flaunt knowledge -.23** .04 -.10** .04 -.15** .04 
Hurt or hinder  -.11** .05 -.16** .05 -.05** .05 
Take control -.10** .03 -.05** .03 -.12** .03 
Benefit from output .09** .03 .05** .03 .14** .03 
Fulfill obligations a .03** .03 .06** .03 .09** .03 
Benefit the recipient .20** .03 .07** .03 .17** .03 
       
       -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood 
2396.24 2471.96 2595.48 
 Note. N = 1,075. a This motive is not hypothesized as a mediator because it cannot be 
categorized as self-serving or prosocial. Unsolicited advice is coded 1 = unsolicited advice, 0 
= solicited advice. Unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors are reported. * p 
< .05 ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 8 
Mediation Results for Unsolicited Advice, Perceptions of the Advisor’s Motives, and Daily 




         Usefulness          Learning    Performance 
Expose differences .005 [-.003, .018] .002 [-.007, .013] .01 [.000, .024] 
Flaunt knowledge -.054 [-.088, -.026] -.022 [-.045, -.004] -.036 [-.064, -.013] 
Hurt or hinder -.023 [-.048, -.004] -.033 [-.059, -.012] -.01 [-.033, .009] 
Take control -.009 [-.025, .004] -.004 [-.014, .002] -.011 [-.028, .004] 
Benefit from output -.011 [-.025, .000] -.006 [-.017, .001] -.017 [-.036, .000] 
Fulfill obligationsa -.004 [-.014, .004] -.009 [-.021, .000] -.013 [-.028, -.002] 
Benefit the recipient -.04 [-.066, -.018] -.015 [-.031, -.002] -.033 [-.057, -.014] 
 
Note. a This motive is not hypothesized as a mediator because it cannot be categorized as self-
serving or prosocial. Mediation is supported when the 95% confidence interval around each 
indirect effect excludes zero. Confidence intervals are based on 20,000 repetitions. Bold 
values reflect confidence intervals that exclude zero. 
  




Results of Moderated Mediation Models of Friendship as a First-Stage Moderator for Unsolicited Advice, Perceptions of the Advisor’s Motives, 
and Estimates of Advice Usefulness, Learning, and Performance in Study 3 











Predictor    b s.e.    b s.e.    b s.e.    b s.e.     b s.e. 
Intercept 3.66*** .12* 5.52*** .07* 1.73*** .20*  .17*** .28* .50**** .25* 
Unsolicited advice condition  -.50*** .17* -.31** .10* -.33*** .06* -.29*** .08* -.33***   .07* 
Friendship condition -.29* .17* -.03* .10*       
Unsolicited advice condition x 
Friendship condition 
-.10* .24* -.06* .14*       
Self-serving motives     -.13*** .02 -.01* .03 -.05***   .03 
Prosocial motives      .52*** .03  .58*** .04  .62***   .04 
           
F 8.76 5.19 147.93 70.93 109.55 
R squared 0.04 0.02 00.42 00.25 00.34 
Note. N = 629. Unstandardized coefficients are reported. Statistical conclusions remain the same if the three models predicting advice outcomes 
include the friendship condition and the interaction term. Unsolicited advice is coded as 1 = unsolicited, 0 = solicited. Friendship is coded as 1 = 
a close personal friend at work, 0 = coworker. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 10 
First-Stage Moderated Mediation Indices for Friendship as a Moderator of the Relation between Advice Solicitation and Outcomes via 
Perceptions of Self-Serving and Prosocial Motives 
Outcomes Moderator: Friendship 
Mediator: Self-serving motives 
Conditional 
Indirect Effect CI (Lower) CI (Upper) 
Perceptions of advice 
usefulness 
Close friend at work -.08 -.13 -.04 
Coworker -.06 -.12 -.02 
  -.01 -.07 .05 
Perceptions of learning 
potential 
Close friend at work .01 -.03 .05 
Coworker .01 -.02 .04 
  .00 -.01 .02 
Perceptions of performance 
potential 
Close friend at work -.03 -.07 -.00 
Coworker -.02 -.06 -.00 
  -.00 -.03 .02 
  Mediator: Prosocial motives 
Perceptions of advice 
usefulness 
Close friend at work -.13 -.23 -.03 
Coworker -.16 -.28 .04 
  .03 -.11 .18 
Perceptions of learning 
potential 
Close friend at work -.13 -.25 -.02 
Coworker -.18 -.33 -.04 
  .04 -.12 .22 
Perceptions of performance 
potential 
Close friend at work -.15 -.28 -.04 
Coworker -.19 -.34 -.05 
  .04 -.14 .22 
Note: N = 415. Indices of moderated mediation (difference between the conditional indirect effects) are shown in italics. Moderated mediation is 
supported when the confidence interval excludes zero. Confidence intervals are based on 5,000 repetitions. 




Study 1 Convergent Validity Analyses 
 
In Study 1, due to the effort- and time-intensive nature of requiring participants to rate 
multiple advice relationships on multiple measures, we used abbreviated measures of our key 
constructs. To ensure that these measures converged with the scores derived from longer 
measures, we collected data from 199 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were asked to identify up to 10 people who provide them with either unsolicited 
or solicited advice, and then to provide their evaluations of each person’s social motives and 
the usefulness of their advice on the abbreviated measures used in Study 1 and a longer 
corresponding measure. On each measure, we asked participants to use a seven-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The longer corresponding measure for 
prosocial motives was an established measure of prosocial intentions (Grant, 2008; Ryan & 
Connell, 1989). To capture self-serving measures, we adapted four items from the Rioux and 
Penner (2001) impression management scale. For perceptions of advice usefulness, we 
adapted Fisher’s (2017) measure of intervention usefulness. The items from Study 1 are 
shown alongside the items from each of these longer corresponding measures in Table A1. In 
a factor analysis of these items, results showed that each item loaded on their longer 
corresponding scale. 
Study 1 Supplemental Analyses 
We also include a series of exploratory tests that, while not a formal part of our model 
due to space and model parsimony considerations, may offer meaningful insights into 
moderators of recipient reactions to unsolicited advice and can inform future theory and 
research (see Table A2). The first exploratory moderator concerns the social context in which 
unsolicited and solicited advice are shared. Employees evaluate behaviors in context by 
considering the base rates of various behaviors (Johns, 2006), so if a recipient receives 
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unsolicited advice from an advisor who tends to share unsolicited advice with the same set of 
coworkers as the recipient, the offer of advice is likely to be normalized, and the recipient 
may be less likely to attribute the unsolicited advice to self-serving motives (as it is seen as a 
common, socially sanctioned behavior for the advisor). This logic suggests a two-way 
interaction between receiving unsolicited advice and unsolicited advice network overlap (i.e., 
the proportion of third-party connections in common) in predicting perceptions of self-
serving motives. 
The second and third exploratory moderators concern the structural position of the 
advisor in the unsolicited advice network at work, which is relevant because network 
positions are likely to affect an individual’s exposure and access to information in the 
workplace and may therefore affect recipient reactions to advice. If the advisor is central, he 
or she is likely to be seen providing unsolicited advice to many others at work (Casciaro, 
1998), and in keeping with the logic above, receiving unsolicited advice may be seen as 
normalized and therefore less indicative of self-serving attributions. We used in-degree as our 
measure of centrality, which captures the number of ties the advisor had in the unsolicited 
advice network, divided by total number of possible ties in the company (Freeman, 1979). If 
the advisor is a broker, he or she offers unsolicited advice to recipients who do not share 
advice with each other. The broker may therefore suffer from a “multiple insider” problem 
(Burt, 2005) in which he or she advises multiple social groups, raising the question of 
whether the advice is suspicious and self-serving. This may lead to stronger attributions of 
self-serving motives when recipients receive unsolicited advice from brokers. We measured 
brokerage using Burt’s constraint (Burt, 1992). The results of these first three moderator tests 
are shown in Table A2. In these tests, we added product terms to each of the final models 
reported in the main body of the paper (see Table 3). However, none was supported. 
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Study 2 Exploratory Pilot Research to Develop List of Perceived Motives (Attributions) 
Method. We recruited full-time employees (N = 150, Mage = 36.33, SD = 10.79) from 
Prolific to participate in this inductive qualitative study about why people provide unsolicited 
or solicited advice. Our aim in this research was to identify the broad range of reasons why 
employees think others provide unsolicited or solicited advice, and then distill and organize 
these reasons (attributions of the advisor’s motive) into a comprehensive set of internally 
coherent but distinguishable attributions that capture the reasons why employees think others 
provide unsolicited or solicited advice. To begin, we asked employees about occasions when 
they received either unsolicited or solicited advice, presented in randomized order to 
minimize order effects. We asked: 
Please think about a time at work when someone gave you advice you did not ask for 
(unsolicited advice) [when you asked for advice and someone gave it to you (solicited 
advice)]. In the space below, please write 3-5 sentences describing the unsolicited 
(solicited) advice and the situation. 
 
Then, after writing 3-5 sentences about the advice episode, we asked participants, 
“Why do you think you received unsolicited (solicited) advice from this person at work? 
What were their motivations?” This procedure resulted in 300 usable descriptions of why 
people provided unsolicited advice and solicited advice (i.e., attributions of advisors’ 
motives, which was our unit of analysis). 
Second, we followed the coding procedures outlined by Williamson et al. (1982) to 
derive a set of motives that would capture the reasons for unsolicited or solicited advice 
described by participants. The first and second authors independently read each participant’s 
description of why they received unsolicited or solicited advice, and then each created a set of 
motives (attributions). The authors then met to discuss and combine their two sets of 
attributions into a single list of attributions that were comprehensive (i.e., they captured the 
full range of reasons why people provide unsolicited or solicited advice described by 
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participants), yet distinct from each other (i.e., each attribution was meaningfully different 
from other attributions). 
Third, we followed best-practice recommendations described by Hinkin and Tracey 
(1999) and updated by Colquitt et al. (2019) in assessing the content validity of our 
attributions. Specifically, we asked two research assistants with backgrounds in 
organizational behavior to rate the extent to which each participant’s description of why they 
received unsolicited or solicited advice matched the attributions we created. We provided 
research assistants with the list of attributions we created, along with relevant examples (see 
Table 4). To account for the possibility that another attribution not included in our list was a 
better match to the description provided by the participant, we also included the option, 
“another reason not mentioned here.” We then asked the research assistants to read each 
participant’s description of an occasion when they received unsolicited or solicited advice 
(including why they think the other person provided it) and rate how well the description 
matches each attribution on a scale from 1-7 (where 1 = description does an extremely bad 
job of capturing the perceived motivations and 7 = description does an extremely good job of 
capturing the perceived motivations). 
Finally, to evaluate the content validity of our attributions, we followed Colquitt et al. 
(2019, p. 7) and calculated two content validity statistics. Recall that the aim of this research 
was to distill and organize employees’ descriptions of why they received unsolicited or 
solicited advice into a set of comprehensive but distinguishable attributions. First, if our 
attributions are comprehensive, each of the descriptions that employees provided should 
match at least one of the attributions provided. To evaluate this aspect of content validity, we 
calculated a Hinkin Tracey correspondence (htc) statistic, which captures definitional 
correspondence—the extent to which the participant’s description matches an attribution. It is 
measured by taking the average definitional correspondence rating (i.e., the average of the 
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two research assistants’ ratings capturing how well the description matched the attribution) 
and dividing it by the maximum anchor of the rating scale (7). Second, if our attributions are 
distinguishable, each of the descriptions that employees provided should match one 
attribution more strongly than other attributions provided. To evaluate this second aspect of 
content validity, we calculated a Hinkin Tracey distinctiveness (htd) statistic, which captures 
definitional distinctiveness—the extent to which the participant’s description corresponds to a 
single attribution, relative to the other attributions provided. It is measured by taking the 
average of the differences between a focal attribution’s rating and all other attribution ratings, 
and then dividing by (the number of anchors – 1). 
Results and Discussion. Content validity statistics for each attribution are provided in 
Table 4. In all cases, research assistants rated that the participants’ descriptions of why they 
received unsolicited or solicited advice matched one of the attributions to a high degree 
(definitional correspondence), with htc statistics ranging from .59 to .96. Raters also found 
that participants’ descriptions corresponded more closely to a focal attribution than to other 
attributions listed (including an exclusion category, “another reason not mentioned here”), 
with all htd statistics in the high range exceeding .41. Taken together, these results provide 
evidence in support of the content validity of the resulting list of attributions in two ways. 
First, the htc statistics indicate that when judges read participants’ descriptions for why they 
received unsolicited or solicited advice, they found that these descriptions matched one of the 
attributions provided to a high degree. This finding suggests that our attributions are valid 
representations of why people are perceived to provide unsolicited or solicited advice. 
Second, the htd statistics indicate participants’ descriptions of advice episodes were judged as 
matching one distinct attribution, relative to the other attributions provided. Thus, this finding 
provides support for the idea that our list of attributions is distinctive in capturing the key 
motives for why people are perceived to provide unsolicited or solicited advice at work. 
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Study 3 Inclusion Criteria 
 To ensure that our sample met best-practice recommendations for data quality, we set 
several inclusion rules prior to collecting data. First, we included an attention check at the 
beginning of the experiment to screen out people who did not read and follow instructions 
closely, which led to 68 participants being excluded. Second, we examined the IP addresses 
of all participants to ensure that no responses came from the same individual (no participants 
were excluded). Third, we included an open-ended question at the end of the experiment 
where we asked individuals to report whether they experienced any technical difficulties that 
may have interfered with the quality of their data, and no participants reported technical 
difficulties that would justify exclusion. Fourth, we inspected the time it took for each 
participant to complete the experiment to assess whether participants were rushed (taking too 
little time, as reflected by a completion time with a percentile rank less than 2.5%) or 
distracted (taking too much time, as reflected by a completion time with a percentile rank 
higher than 97.5), which led to 30 additional participants being excluded. Together, we 




RECEIVING UNSOLICITED ADVICE      53 
 
Table A1 
Results from a Factor Analysis of Study 1 Items and Longer Measures 
 Factor loading 
Item 1 2 3 
Factor 1: Prosocial motives    
… is doing so for my own personal benefit .61 -.03 .08 
… cares about benefitting others through their work .91 -.03 .01 
… wants to help others through their work .94 -.03 -.02 
… wants to have a positive impact on others .93 .02 -.02 
… feels it is important for them to do good for others through their 
work 
.90 .05 -.01 
Factor 2: Self-serving motives    
… is doing so to try to impress me .02 .63 -.12 
… wants to look better than my other coworkers -.02 .71 -.13 
… wants to avoid looking bad in front of others .03 .94 .02 
… wants to avoid looking lazy .04 .89 .00 
… wants to avoid a reprimand from the boss -.07 .70 .10 
Factor 3: Perceptions of advice usefulness    
Do you find this person’s advice useful? .08 -.03 .84 
Do you try to implement this person’s advice? -.01 .07 .96 
Is this person’s advice likely to help you make improvements? .02 .03 .92 
Does this person’s advice make something (a task, a problem, an 
issue) better? 
-.03 .01 .92 
Do you tend to reject this person’s advice? (reverse-scored) -.00 .09 .72 
Does this person’s advice not affect you one way or another? 
(reverse-scored) 
.04 -.05 .42 
Note. The items for self-serving and prosocial motives were preceded with the stem, “This 
person offers me advice because he or she…”. Items from Study 1 are in bold. The extraction 
method was principal axis factoring with an oblique (Direct oblimin) rotation. Factor 
loadings above .30 are in bold. Longer measures are the Rioux and Penner (2001) impression 
management scale and the prosocial motivation measure from Grant (2008). The item-total 
correlations for prosocial motives, self-serving motives, and usefulness were .66, .65, and .86, 
respectively. 




Supplemental Analyses of Exploratory Moderators for Study 1 
Study Exploratory moderator Interaction Outcome Estimate Conclusion 
1 Recipients will be less likely to 
attribute unsolicited advice to self-
serving motives when the recipient 
and advisor have many third-party 
ties in common 
 
Two-way interaction between 
unsolicited advice and proportion of 
unsolicited advice ties the recipient 
had in common with each advisor (i.e., 






(p = .210) 
Not 
supported 
1 Recipients will be more likely to 
attribute solicited advice to 
prosocial motives when the 
recipient and advisor have many 
third-party ties in common 
 
Two-way interaction between 
unsolicited advice and proportion of 
solicited advice ties the recipient had 
in common with each advisor (i.e., 





(p = .355) 
Not 
supported 
1 Recipients will be less likely to 
attribute unsolicited advice to self-
serving motives when the advisor is 
central in the unsolicited advice 
network 
 
Two-way interaction between 
unsolicited advice and number of ties 
the advisor had in the unsolicited 
advice network, divided by total 
number of possible ties in the 






(p = .195) 
Not 
supported 
1 Recipients will be more likely to 
attribute solicited advice to 
prosocial motives when the advisor 
Two-way interaction between 
unsolicited advice and number of ties 
the advisor had in the solicited advice 




(p = .346) 
Not 
supported 
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is central in the solicited advice 
network 
 
possible ties in the company (i.e., in-
degree centrality) 
 
1 Recipients will be more likely to 
attribute unsolicited advice to self-
serving motives when the advisor is 
a broker in the unsolicited advice 
network 
 
Two-way interaction between 
unsolicited advice and advisor 





(p = .200) 
Not 
supported 
1 Recipients will be less likely to 
attribute solicited advice to 
prosocial motives when the advisor 
is a broker in the solicited advice 
network 
Two-way interaction between 
unsolicited advice and advisor 




(p = .491) 
Not 
supported 
      
Note. All exploratory tests were conducted by adding interaction terms to the cross-classified models reported in Table 3. 
